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I. INTRODUCTION
Settlement negotiations are often frustrated in products liability cases,
as in all tort actions, where the decision to try the case is "based on the
client's psychological need for retribution, vindication or justice." 2 High-
cost litigation and complete discovery, "rather than settlement and
[alternative dispute resolution], characterize these cases where deterrence is
a primary concern: plaintiffs seek deterrence of poor products ... among
other goals; defendants seek deterrence of repetitive suits regarding the
same product. The result: full-tilt litigation." 3
Moreover, settlement negotiations are often frustrated in design defect
cases because a stigma attaches to the party who first suggests settlement.4
This stigma attaches based on a perceived fear of trial or case weakness or
an impression of selling out one's case. 5 Moreover, because discovery
basically must be completed before liability can be established in design
1 See generally A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures 1998). This film was based
on the national bestseller by Jonathan Harr. See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL
ACTION (1995).
2 RICHARD J. HEAFEY & DON M. KENNEDY, PRODUCT LIABnLrr: WINNING
STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES § 13.02 (1996). This point is well illustrated in the recent
motion picture A Civil Action. See generally A CIVIL ACTION, supra note 1. A Civil
Action is based on the true story of attorney Jan Schlichtmann who represented a
neighborhood of families in Woburn, Massachusetts. The families claimed that several
manufacturing plants in the area were dumping toxins in the local drinking water
supply, causing several members in the community to develop cancer. Schlichtmann
rejected numerous attempts by opposing counsel to settle, insisting a full trial would
bring a more favorable outcome for his clients. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict
for the defendant. The loss from this trial and the failure to accept the defendant's
lucrative settlement offer forced Schlichtmann and his law firm into bankruptcy. See id.
3 CPR INST. FOR DIsPUTE RESOLUION, ADR CoST SAVINGS AND BENEFr
STUDms 1-73 (1994).
4 See HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 13.05.
5 See id.
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defect cases, settlement prior to discovery is unlikely because the plaintiff
has little bargaining power. 6
Stated above are some of the reasons why the parties do not voluntarily
implement alternative dispute resolution (ADR)7 techniques in an attempt to
settle products liability cases. 8 However, "mandatory," or court-ordered,
ADR may be very useful in products liability cases because the court
"rather than a party first suggests settlement." 9
This Note asserts that federal courts should use the mandatory summary
jury trial (SJT)10 to promote the settlement of design defect cases11 bound
for trial. While there has been approval of the use of the SJT to promote
the settlement of products liability cases generally, 12 the specific use of
SJTs in the settlement of design defect 13 cases has not been explored to
date. The exploration of using the SJT with design defect cases is especially
timely in light of the 1998 Restatement (Third) of Torts. Various
6 See infra Part II.C.
7 Generally defined, ADR is anything short of "full-tilt litigation" on the merits.
ELIZABETH PLAPINGER ET AL., CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES, JUDGE'S DESKBOOK ON
COURT ADR (Elizabeth Plapinger et al. eds., 1993), reprinted in part in Elizabeth
Plapinger et al., Center for Pub. Resources, Judge's Deskbook on Court ADR, 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LrnG. 9, 9 (1994). Major court ADR processes include
mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and summary jury trial. See id.,
reprinted in part in Elizabeth Plapinger et al., Center for Pub. Resources, Judge's
Deskbook on Court ADR, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LIG. 9, 9-15 (1994).
8 See HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 13.05. "The schizophrenia of
simultaneously litigating a lawsuit and attempting to negotiate a settlement may result in
a reluctance to take what appears to be a 'vulnerable' or 'soft' position." Id. (citing
Curtis H. Barnette, The Importance of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Reducing
Litigation Costs as a Corporate Objective, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 279 (1984)).
9 HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 13.02. This is the primary reason
"mandatory," or court-ordered summary jury trial (SJT) is recommended in this Note.
10 This Note focuses on the federal use of mandatory SJTs because federal courts
have the authority to implement SJTs. See infra Part III.A. However, where state
courts have the authority, they should also implement SJTs to promote the settlement of
design defect cases.
11 Although arising under state law, design defect claims can be pursued in federal
court where there is diversity of citizenship between the opposing parties and the claim
meets the amount in controversy requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
12 See THOMAS D. LAMBROS, THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL AND OTHER
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 16 (1984).
13 Design defect claims are one of three types of product defect claims in products
liability law. See infra note 14. For the definition of a design defect as opposed to a
manufacturing defect or a warning defect, see infra notes 14-17.
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characteristics of products liability law under the Restatement (Third) make
the SJT an excellent tool to promote the settlement of design defect cases.
In order to understand why SJT is an appropriate settlement technique
in design defect cases, the standards of liability under the Restatement
(Third) and characteristics of design defect cases must be discussed. Part II
of this Note describes liability standards for design defect cases. Part II also
provides a summation of the characteristics of design defect cases. Part III
explains the creation, development, advantages, and disadvantages of SJTs.
Part IV explains the characteristics of design defect cases that make them
well suited for SJTs. Part IV also suggests recommendations for the SJT
procedure in design defect cases. Part V of this Note concludes that the
mandatory SJT should be used to promote the settlement of design defect
cases bound for trial.
II. LIABILITY STANDARDS FOR DESIGN
DEFECT CASES
A significant change in products liability law from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts made by the Restatement (Third) of Torts was the division
of product defect cases into three categoriesl 4-manufacturing defects, 15
design defects, 16 and warning defects. 17 These three categories were
14 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability provides: "A product is
defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is
defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings."
RESTATEMENT (TImD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABITY § 2 (1998).
15 A manufacturing defect is described as follows: "A product... contains a
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product." Id.
§ 2(a).
16 The Restatement (Third) describes a design defect as follows:
A product:
is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain
of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe.
Id. § 2(b) (emphasis added). The focus of this Note is on design defect cases, which,
one study found, comprised 75% of all products liability claims in excess of $100,000
where the main theory of liability was strict liability. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PRODUCTS LiABrnrry AND SAFETY-CASES AND MATERALS 23-24 (2d ed. 1989).
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created in order to retain strict liability for manufacturing defects, but apply
negligence to design and warning defects. 18 Subpart A of this Part describes
the major changes in the Restatement (Third). Changes in the Restatement
(Third) that will be discussed below and favor the use of SJT include the
following: (1) the shift from a strict liability standard for plaintiffs to a
negligence standard and (2) requiring proof of a reasonable alternative
design under the design defect risk-utility test. Subpart B of this Part
discusses an alternative to the Restatement (Third) liability standard-the
consumer expectation test; this standard also has characteristics that favor
settlement with the SJT. Furthermore, both subpart A and subpart B of this
Part examine the discovery strategies necessary to obtain evidence
sufficient to establish liability under the Restatement (Third)'s risk-utility
test and the consumer expectations test. Finally, subpart C of this Part
provides a summation of the characteristics of design defect cases.
A. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Shifting from Strict Liability to
Negligence and Requiring Proof of a Reasonable Alternative
Design Under the Risk- Utility Test
There are two primary reasons why the Restatement (Third) approach
makes design defect cases well suited for the SJT. First, as a result of the
shift from strict liability to negligence and the requirement that a safer
alternative design exist, the key issues involved are decided by the jury. 19
17 A warning defect is described as follows:
A product:
is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIArILITY § 2(c) (1998).
18 See id. § 1 cmt. a; see also § 1 reporter's note on cmt. a (recognizing abundant
case law authority for dividing product defects into three categories and applying a
different liability standard depending on the type of defect involved). But see Frank J.
Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2(b): Design
Defect, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 167, 176-79 (1995) (arguing that the distinction between
manufacturing defects and design defects is difficult to make in practice and is not
uniformly supported by the case law).
19 See infra Part V.A.
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Second, under the Restatement (Third) risk-utility test, discovery must be
completed to obtain evidence sufficient to establish liability; thus, design
defect cases are in a posture ready for trial.20
1. Shifting from Strict Liability to Negligence
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the ,Restatement (Second) of Torts21
established that defective product cases were to be determined by a strict
liability standard. 22 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,23 which held
that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market ... proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being," 24 drove the Restatement (Second). The Greenman case influenced
the approach of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,25 which
applied strict liability in all defective product cases. However, one of the
problems courts have struggled with under the section 402A approach has
been the application of strict liability to all defective products cases. 26
20 See id.
21 The text of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provided as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
22 Section 402A's concept of strict liability in product defect cases was widely
accepted by courts across the United States in the 1960s. See David G. Owen,
Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REv. 743, 744 (1996).
23 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
24 Id. at 900.
25 See David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REv. 273, 277-
78 (1998).
26 Section 402A applied strict liability to defective product cases as a whole and
did not distinguish between manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects.
See Owen, supra note 22, at 748-49.
289
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The Restatement (Third) of Torts replaced section 402A in 1998. As
mentioned above, this replacement resulted in the following three functional
categories for product defect cases: manufacturing defects, design defects,
and warning defects.27 Additionally, after thirty years of strict liability
under section 402A, a negligence standard has officially been applied to
design and warning defect cases. 28 This approach by the Restatement
(Third) expressly applying negligence to design defect cases is consistent
with what the majority of courts have been doing but not saying. 29 "It has
been an open secret for many years that courts have been purporting to
apply 'strict' liability doctrine to design ... cases while in fact applying
principles that look remarkably like negligence." '30 However, courts today
are still struggling to make sense out of section 402A's application of strict
liability in all defective product cases. 31 Therefore, the Restatement (Third)
serves to reduce the confusion by promoting the expressly stated application
of negligence to design defect cases across the United States. 32
2. Requiring Proof of a Reasonable Alternative Design Under the
Restatement (Third) of Torts' Risk-Utility Test
It is evident that the majority of jurisdictions in the United States apply
a risk-utility test in design defect cases. 33 Under the risk-utility analysis, a
27 See supra notes 15-17 (quoting the Restatement (Third)'s definitions of
manufacturing defect, design defect, and warning defect).
28 See RESTATEMENT (THnRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a (1998) ("Subsections (b) and
(c), which impose liability for products that are defectively designed or sold without
adequate warnings or instructions and are thus not reasonably safe, achieve the same
general objectives as does liability predicated on negligence."); see also id. § 1 cmt. a
("Sections 2(b) and 2(c) [dealing with design and warning defects] rely on a
reasonableness test traditionally used in determining whether an actor has been
negligent."). The Restatement (Third) retained strict liability for manufacturing defect
cases. See id. § 2 cmt. a.
29 See Owen, supra note 22, at 748-49.
30 Id. at 749.
31 See id. at 745-46.
32 Cf Owen, supra note 25, at 292. But see John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New
Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402: Products
Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U.
MEM. L. REv. 493, 553 (1996) (arguing that the majority of jurisdictions apply strict
liability to design defect cases without proof of negligence).
33 Under the risk-utility test, a product is defective if the risks of the product
outweigh its utility. See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994)
290
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number of factors are considered to determine whether the risks of a
product outweigh its utility. 34 The Restatement (Third)'s risk-utility test 35
(explaining that a design defect exists only if the inherent dangers of a design outweigh
the benefits of the design); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 182 (Colo. 1992)
(stating that a design is defective if the risk of injury is not outweighed by the benefits
of the design; upholding a jury instruction using such a definition); Banks v. ICI Ams.,
Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (indicating that several jurisdictions determine
whether a design defect exists by weighing the inherent risk in a product design against
the "utility or benefit derived from the product"); Wagatsuma v. Patch, 879 P.2d 572,
584 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that a design defect does not exist if the inherent
danger in a design is not outweighed by the benefit of the design); Guiggey v.
Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me. 1992) ("To determine whether a product is
defectively dangerous, we balance the danger presented by the product against its
utility."); Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 373, 380 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that the jury must balance the risk of harm inherent in a design against the
design's utility in determining whether there is a design defect); Sperry-New Holland v.
Prestage, 617 So.2d 248, 254 (Miss. 1993) (holding that a defect in design exists if the
danger that a product creates outweighs the utility); Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 654
A.2d 1365, 1371 (N.J. 1995) (stating that the test for determining design defects is
whether the risks of a product outweigh the product's utility); Denny v. Ford Motor
Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735-36 (N.Y. 1995) (explaining that a design defect can be
determined by "weighing... the product's benefits against its risks" and
"weighing... the product's dangers against its over-all advantages"); Caterpillar, Inc.
v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. 1995) (explaining that the test for design defects
requires weighing the risks involved with the use of a product against utility of the
product); see also RSATEMENT (THmD) OF TORTS § 2 reporter's note' on cmt. d,
subparts II.B-II.C (1998). But see Vandall, supra note 18, at 168-73 (arguing that risk-
utility balancing in design defect cases is not supported by a majority of jurisdictions).
34 The Restatement (Third) outlines factors that typically are used in a risk-utility
analysis in stating:
A broad range of factors may be considered in determining whether an alternative
design is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably
safe. The factors include, among others, the magnitude and probability of the
foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions and warnings accompanying the
product, and the nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the
product .... The relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as
designed and as it alternatively could have been designed may also be considered.
Thus, the likely effects of the alternative design on production costs; the effects of
the alternative design on product longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics; and
the range of consumer choice among products are factors that may be taken into
account. A plaintiff is not necessarily required to introduce proof on all of these
factors; their relevance, and the relevance of other factors, will vary from case to
case.
RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. f (1998).
35 See id. (quoting the factors used in the Restatement (Third) risk-utility'analysis).
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determines whether some reasonable alternative design would have been
better than the manufacturer's chosen design. 36 "More specifically, the test
is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so,
whether the omission of the alternative design ... rendered the product not
reasonably safe." 37 As with the adoption of the negligence standard, the
Restatement (Third) of Torts will be instrumental in promoting the uniform
requirement of proving an alternative design in design defect cases. 38
From a litigation standpoint, proving an alternative design requires the
plaintiff to plan discovery strategically in order to obtain evidence sufficient
to establish liability. 39 There are four primary things a plaintiff must do to
establish liability under the risk-utility test, which require extensive
discovery. First, the plaintiff must prove that the risks created by the
product were reasonably foreseeable based on the manufacturer's testing
and analysis of the product prior to distribution.40 Second, the plaintiff
must develop a specific product design that would enhance safety in a
manner superior to the original product.41 "In this process the defendant's
36 Basically, the jury must determine whether a reasonable person could conclude
that a safer alternative design could have been adopted based on the factors listed
above. See supra note 34.
37 Id. § 2 cmt. d.
38 Cf. Owen, supra note 25, at 291-92. The Restatement (Third) points out that
nearly every jurisdiction requires proof of an alternative design, whether explicitly or
implicitly. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 reporter's note on cmt. d, subpart
I (1998). Additionally, the issue that is nearly always litigated in design defect cases is
whether the manufacturer could have adopted an alternative design that would have
prevented the plaintiff's harm. See David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design
Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1661, 1675
n.48 (1997). But see Frank J. Vandall, The American Law Institute Is Dead in the
Water, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 802-04 (1998) (arguing that section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third) does not apply traditional negligence, but rather "radical
negligence," because of the requirement of proving a reasonable alternative design);
Vandall, supra note 18, at 174-76 (stating that the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions have rejected the requirement of proving a reasonable alternative design);
Vargo, supra note 32, at 536-37 (same).
39 See Larry S. Stewart, A New Frontier: Design Defect Cases and the New
Restatement, TRIAL, Nov. 1998, at 20, 24.
40 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmts. m, n (1998)). "Of
course a seller bears responsibility to perform reasonable testing prior to marketing a
product and to discover risks ... that such testing would reveal." RESTATEMENT
(TH RD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. n (1998).
41 See Stewart, supra note 39, at 24.
[Vol. 15:1 19991
MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY TRIAL IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
internal data should not be overlooked. Often, the defendant has redesigned
the product or produced other product models incorporating safer designs,
or its employees have criticized the design in question." 42 Thus, depositions
of the defendant's product design personnel are very important in
determining the existence of a reasonable alternative design.43 Third, the
plaintiff must inquire into the cost of manufacturing the alternative design,
although it is not necessary to establish the specific costs and benefits of the
alternative design.44 Fourth, the techniques used to advertise and market
the product must be investigated to determine whether the manufacturer
created misleading consumer expectations 45 regarding performance or
safety of the product. 46
After all of these factors have been thoroughly investigated in
discovery, the plaintiff is ready to pursue the liability issue. The liability
issue is whether the manufacturer negligently failed to adopt a safer
alternative design that could have served the same purpose as the defective
product. 47 As a result, under the risk-utility test, discovery basically must
be completed in order to obtain evidence sufficient to establish liability. 48
In addition, qualified expert testimony will suffice in proving the
existence of a safer alternative design "if it reasonably supports the
conclusion that a reasonable alternative design could have been practically
adopted at the time of sale." 49 Moreover, "[i]n many cases, the plaintiff
must rely on expert testimony." 50 Overall, under the risk-utility test the
plaintiff must expend substantial dollars on discovery to establish liability
through the use of experts, and the plaintiff will not be able to establish
liability until discovery is basically completed.
42Id.
43 See -EAmY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 4.04.
44 See Stewart, supra note 39, at 24 (citing RESTATEmENT (THuM) oF TORTS § 2
cmt. f (1998)).
45 Consumer expectations cannot be used as an independent basis to establish a
defective design under the new Restatement. See RFSTATE ENT (THriD) OF TORTS § 2
cmt. g (1998). However, consumer expectations may be considered in determining
whether omission of an alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe. See
id. § 2 cmt. f.
46 See Stewart, supra note 39, at 25 (citing RESTATE ENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2
cmts. f, g).
47 See HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 4.04.
48 See id. (explaining that the plaintiff must perform extensive discovery in order
to establish the existence of liability under the risk-utility test).
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF ToRTs § 2 cmt. f (1998).
50 Id.
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B. The Consumer Expectations Test
Although considered a minority view, the non-Restatement view, or
consumer expectations test, is still used in some jurisdictions. 5 1 "The
consumer expectations test is based on the manufacturer's moral
responsibility to tell the truth about the product."52 When manufacturers
fail to do this, consumers may be tricked into thinking a product is safer
than it really is because of outrageous advertisement claims. 53
In terms of litigation in consumer expectations test jurisdictions,
plaintiffs should investigate the marketing and advertising materials used by
the manufacturer through depositions of marketing personnel and other
discovery devices. 54 This type of discovery can uncover situations where
the manufacturer misled consumers into believing that a particular product
design was safe without actually telling consumers the product was safe. 55
Moreover, this investigation of marketing and advertising is critical "[iun an
era when manufacturers can manipulate consumers into believing that
grossly dangerous products will not [cause] harm." 56
Therefore, as under the risk-utility test, discovery under the consumer
expectations test must be substantially completed in order to obtain
evidence sufficient to establish liability. 57 The use of expert testimony
generally is not required under the consumer expectations test.58 However,
in most cases an expert will assist the jury in determining what the ordinary
expectations 59 of a product are when the manufacturer uses advertisements
51 See RESTATEMENT (TmIRD) OF TORTS § 2 reporter's note on cmt. d (explaining
that only six states-Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin-
use the consumer expectations test as an independent test for design defect cases). But
see Vargo, supra note 32, at 591 (listing 10 states that use the consumer expectations
test for strict liability design defects). The Restatement (Third) does not allow use of the
consumer expectations as an independent basis of proving a design defect. See supra
note 45.
52 HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 4.03.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 Stewart, supra note 39, at 22.
57 See HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 4.04 ("ITihe more detailed the
evidentiary presentation, the more the jury is likely to perceive the [advertising]
'trick.'").
58 See id.
59 See Morton v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 25 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) ("[E]xpert testimony may be admissible to prove what ordinary
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that are difficult to identify as misleading. 60 Thus, products liability claims
in jurisdictions using the consumer expectations test are similar to claims in
jurisdictions using the risk-utility test in that the plaintiff must substantially
complete discovery and use expert witnesses to establish liability.
C. Summation of Design Defect Characteristics Under the Liability
Standards
In summation, most courts today are still struggling with the
Restatement (Second) section 402A application of strict liability in design
defect cases. 61 Therefore, most courts apply a negligence standard while
calling it strict liability. 62 The Restatement (Third) adoption of a specific
negligence standard will promote the uniform application of negligence in
design defect cases. 63 Likewise, by explicitly requiring proof of a
reasonable alternative design, the Restatement (Third) will promote the
uniform application of this standard in design defect cases.64
consumers of the products actually expect when those expectations are beyond the lay
experience... [of] jurors.").
60 See HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 4.03 n.6 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1994) (explaining the deceptive nature in cigarette
advertisements that associate youthful, healthy, and adventurous activity with
smoking)).
61 See Owen, supra note 22, at 745-46.
62 See id. at 748-49.
63 Cf. Owen, supra note 25, at 292. But see Vargo, supra note 32, at 553.
64 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. But see Vandall, supra note 38, at
802-04 (1998) (arguing that section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) does not apply
traditional negligence, but rather "radical negligence," because of the requirement of
proving a reasonable alternative design); Vandall, supra note 18, at 174-76 (stating that
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have rejected the requirement of proving a
reasonable alternative design); Vargo, supra note 32, at 536-37 (same). It is important
to note that changes in the Restatement (Third)-the shift from strict liability to
negligence and requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design-support the use of
SJTs in design defect cases. See infra Part IV.A. However, in jurisdictions that do not
follow the Restatement (Third), the plaintiff is still required to substantially complete
discovery and use expert witnesses in order to establish liability in design defect cases.
See supra Part II.B (discussing plaintiff strategies in jurisdictions using the consumer
expectations test). Thus, even in jurisdictions that do not follow the Restatement (Third)
design defect cases are well suited for SJTs because they are in a trial-ready posture
(i.e., discovery basically must be completed before settlement becomes feasible).
Moreover, design defect cases are well suited for SJTs in jurisdictions that do not
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Moreover, under the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests,
discovery basically must be completed in order to obtain evidence sufficient
to establish liability. In the risk-utility analysis, complete discovery of the
manufacturer's design process must be explored to determine if a safer
alternative design could have been chosen. 65 In the consumer expectations
analysis, complete discovery of the manufacturer's advertising and
marketing techniques must be explored to determine whether consumers
likely would be deceived into believing a product is safer than it actually
is. 66 For these reasons, settlement prior to the completion of discovery is
unlikely because the plaintiff has little bargaining power and risks
conveying the perception of a weak case. 67
Furthermore, the use of expert testimony in design defect cases cannot
be underestimated. 68 Experts are used to aid the jury in determining
whether a particular design is defective under both the risk-utility and
consumer expectations tests. 69 In any given case, the testimony of
plaintiff's and defendant's design experts can last two to three weeks at
trial. 70 In addition, design defect cases typically involve expert testimony
from physicians and psychologists in determining damages issues. 71
Testimony from physicians and psychologists can last several days. 72
Therefore, a substantial portion of trial costs in design defect cases can be
follow the Restatement (Third) because substantial savings in expert fees and trial time
can be realized. See infra Part IV.A.
65 See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
66 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
67 See HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 13.05. However, if the defendant
wishes to settle prior to plaintiff obtaining sufficient evidence to establish liability,
settlement prior to completion of discovery is much more likely.
68 See supra notes 50, 59-60 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 50, 59-60 and accompanying text.
70 See Telephone Interview with Robert M. Libbey, Attorney, Law Offices of
Robert M. Libbey (Feb. 15, 1999). Robert M. Libbey has practiced personal injury law
and handled design defect cases for over 30 years in Anchorage, Alaska. He currently
practices law part-time while operating a wilderness lodge in central Alaska.
71 See id.
72 See id.
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attributed to expert testimony,73 and the typical design defect trial can last a
month or longer. 74
III. THE DEVELOPMENT, ADVANTAGES, AND DISADVANTAGES
OF THE MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
"The summary jury trial (SJT) is a flexible, nonbinding ADR process
designed to promote settlement in trial-ready cases headed for protracted
jury trials." 75 In the SJT, jurors are chosen from the regular pool of jurors
and the attorneys for each party present a brief version of their case.76 The
SJT usually lasts one day, but flexibility in length is allowed to achieve a
result most equivalent to an actual jury verdict.77 The jury deliberates and
returns a nonbinding verdict,78 which the parties can use to discuss
settlement negotiations at a post-SJT conference conducted by the court. 79
A. The Development of Federal Authority to Implement the
Summary Jury Trial
U.S. district court Judge Thomas Lambros created the SJT in 1980
while lie presided over two personal injury trials that he thought should be
settled without a full trial.80 Judge Lambros believed that the barriers to
settlement in the these cases resulted from the parties emotionally needing
73 See id. On the average, expert trial testimony in design defect cases costs
between $25,000 and $50,000 per case for plaintiffs. See id. Assuming the defendant
uses expert testimony to rebut the plaintiff's experts, the trial testimony for defendants
per case should be roughly the same.
74 See id.
75 PLAPINGER ET AL., supra note 7, reprinted in part in Elizabeth Plapinger et al.,
Center for Pub. Resources, Judge's Deskbook on Court ADR, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITImG. 9, 15 (1994).
76 See Bobby Marzine Harges, The Promise of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial,
63 TEMP. L. REV. 799, 803-04 (1990).
77 See id. at 804 n.46.
78 There is concern that summary jurors who are informed their verdict is only an
advisory opinion will cut corners in deliberating a verdict in the interest of saving time.
However, studies of mock jurors that have been informed of the hypothetical nature of
their decision have revealed that mock jury verdicts remain highly predictive of actual
trial verdicts. See id. at 809-10.
79 See id. at 804.
80 See LAMBROs, supra note 12, at iii-v.
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their "day in court."' 81 Moreover, he believed these barriers could be
overcome if the parties had the opportunity to state their case and evaluate
the jury's reaction to the conflicting evidence. 82 From these notions, Judge
Lambros conceived of and used a summary trial for the second case, and it
settled without a full trial.83
In creating the SJT, Judge Lambros derived authority from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, he looked to Rule 1, which provides
that the Rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."'84 In addition, Lambros relied
on Rule 16(a) concerning pretrial procedures. 85 Moreover, he relied on
Rules 16(c)(7) and 16(c)(11), both of which encourage settlement through
alternatives to trial. 86 Furthermore, Judge Lambros used Rule 39(c) as
authority to impanel jurors in summary jury trials. 87 Finally, Judge
Lambros justified the SJT by determining the process to be consistent with
81 Id. at 8.
82 See id. Judge Lambros pondered a solution to the parties' resistance to
settlement:
It occurred to me that if only the parties could gaze into a crystal ball and be able
to predict, with a reasonable amount of certainty, what a jury would do in their
respective cases, the parties and counsel would be more willing to reach a
settlement rather than going through the expense and aggravation of a full jury
trial.
Id. at iii. From this, Judge Lambros conceived of the notion of the SJT. See id.
83 See id. at iv. The second case involved a products liability claim for a defective
football helmet. See id.
84 LAMBROS, supra note 12, at 10-11 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
85 See id. at 11. Rule 16(a) states: "In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties . . . to appear before it for a conference or
conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the
action... and (5) facilitating the settlement of the case." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
86 Rules 16(c)(7) and 16(c)(11) provide that: "The participants at any conference
under this rule may consider and take action with respect to ... (7) the possibility of
settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute.., and (11)
such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." FED. R. Civ. P.
16(c)(7), (11).
87 Rule 39(c) provides in pertinent part: "In all actions not triable of right by a
jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory
jury ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c). Although Rule 39 refers to "actions not triable of
right by a jury," Judge Lambros found ample authority in this Rule to impanel jurors
for summary jury trials. See LAMBROS, supra note 12, at 11. But see United States v.
Exum, 748 F. Supp. 512, 513 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Hume v. M & C Management, 129
F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
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Rule 83. 88
During the development of the SJT, the authority of federal judges to
implement mandatory SJTs has been hotly debated primarily because prior
to 1993, Rule 16 did not expressly provide federal courts with such
authority. 89 The enactment of federal statutes and the amendment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during the SJT's development have
changed this debate greatly. First, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
requires federal courts to implement a plan to reduce the expense and delay
of civil justice. 90 The Act specifically mentions the use of SJTs as an ADR
option to reduce the cost and delay of civil justice.91
More importantly, Rule 16(c)(9) was amended in December 1993 to
implicitly grant federal courts authority to implement SJTs. 92 The Advisory
88 See LAMBROS, supra note 12, at 11. Rule 83 provided: "In all cases not
provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in
any manner not inconsistent with these rules .... " FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (amended
1995).
89 See Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting the notion of mandatory SJT in federal court because no expressed authority
existed under Rule 16); see also In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1993)
(same).
90 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 471 note, 472-482
(1994 & Supp. I 1997).
91 See id. § 473(a)(6)(B).
92 Prior to the 1993 amendment, Rule 16(c) provided in pertinent part:
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The Participants at any
conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to
resolve the dispute;
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially
difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties,
difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in disposition of the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (amended 1993); see also Montgomery v. Louis Trauth Dairy,
Inc., 164 F.R.D. 469, 470 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16 prior to
the 1993 amendment).
Rule 16(c)(9) as amended states: "(c) Subjects for Consideration at Pretrial
Conferences. At any conference under this rule consideration may be given, and the
court may take appropriate action, with respect to... (9) settlement and the use of
special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local
rule." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9). In contrast to the old Rule, the amended Rule
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Committee Notes to the 1993 amendment indicate that Rule 16(c)(9) as
amended provides federal courts with the authority to implement mandatory
SJTs, by explaining:
Paragraph (9) is revised to describe more accurately the various
procedures that, in addition to traditional settlement conferences, may be
helpful in settling litigation. Even if a case cannot immediately be settled,
the judge and attorneys can explore possible use of alternative procedures
such as mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and
non-binding arbitration that can lead to consensual resolution of the
dispute without a full trial on the merits. The rule acknowledges the
presence of statutes and local rules or plans that may authorize use of
some of these procedures even when not agreed to by the parties?3
Thus, the drafters specifically state that federal courts have the authority to
order SJTs when authorized by statutes or local rules94 even without the
consent of the parties. 95
B. Commonly Cited Advantages of Using the Summary Jury Trial
There are a number of advantages to using SJTs. One of the most
commonly cited advantages stems from the SJT procedure itself, as the
process usually lasts no more than a day, saving endless days of trial,
witness fees, and court costs when used in cases lasting more than a few
days. 96 Additionally, pretrial settlement is promoted because the parties
have the opportunity to evaluate the jury's reaction to conflicting evidence
in the case and thus can assess the strengths and weaknesses of their
respective positions. 97
Furthermore, because SJT can condense a potentially lengthy trial into
a one-day event, it is a way to keep caseloads in federal district court at a
expressly provides that "the court may take appropriate action... when authorized by
statute or local rule" in presiding over pretrial conferences. Id. (emphasis added); see
also Montgomery, 164 F.R.D. at 470.
93 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
94 For an example of a local rule expressly providing for the use of mandatory
SJT, see Montgomery, 164 F.R.D. at 471 n.4 (quoting S.D. Oluo LOCAL R. 53.1
(providing for mandatory SJT)).
95 See id.
96 See Harges, supra note 76, at 805-06.
97 See Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New
Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 799 (1989).
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manageable level. 98 For example, Judge Arthur Spiegel of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio explained that if 1,000
cases are filed in a given district in one year, ninety-five percent or 950
cases generally settle before trial while five percent or fifty cases go to
trial. 99 Thus, fifty trials must be conducted in this district in one year. 100
Judge Spiegel further explained that there are approximately 200 active trial
days in a given year; thus, if each trial requires a week or more, it is
impossible to dispose of fifty cases in a year.101 Moreover, when the
objective is to dispose of cases within fifteen months after they have been
filed, "it [becomes] obvious that a trial which may last for several weeks or
more can really upset... [the] plan of case disposition." 102 In light of this,
where use of the SJT promotes settlement, the one-day process provides the
court with flexibility to devote attention to and dispose of more cases in a
given year.
Finally, another advantage of the SJT is that it allows each party to
"have their day in court."1 0 3 In this sense, the parties must confront the
opposing position and rationally rebut the arguments of that position while
emotionally processing the effect of those arguments on the jury.' 04 This
process may raise anxiety levels because the strength of each party's
position will "either be confirmed or totally undermined by the verdict. The
verdict is the considered judgment of ... impartial citizens selected in the
same fashion as a real jury." 105 Regardless of the outcome, the process is
psychologically "satisfying to the parties-primarily because of their faith
in the fairness of the jury system.'1 0 6
98 See Harges, supra note 76, at 805-06.
99 See Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CiN. L. REv. 829, 832 (1986).
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 LAMBROS, supra note 12, at 8.
104 See Ann E. Woodley, Strengthening the Summary Jury Trial: A Proposal to
Increase Its Effectiveness and Encourage Uniformity in Its Use, 12 OHiO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 541, 562-63 (1997).
10 5 Id. at 563.
106 Id.
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C. Commonly Cited Disadvantages of Using the Summary Jury Trial
There are open criticisms 10 7 and a few commonly cited disadvantages
of SJTs. One of the most frequently cited is the inability of a summary jury
to assess the credibility of witnesses because all evidence typically is
presented through the parties' attorneys.' 0 8 Thus, critics assert that the
utility of the SJT is limited where a case turns on the credibility of
witnesses, because the summary jury will only judge the credibility of each
party's lawyer.' 0 9 However, "[a] review of the verdicts in cases that have
gone to trial after the summary jury trial ... supports the contention that
the summary jury trial is a reliable predictor of a verdict following a full
trial where the jury had the opportunity to judge witness credibility." n0
Furthermore, where the case revolves around witness credibility, the court
can adjust the SJT process to provide for the limited testimony and cross-
examination of key witnesses. 111
Another commonly cited disadvantage is the expense incurred if the
case fails to settle after the SJT and proceeds to full trial. 112 Although SJT
is far less expensive than a full trial because it is conducted in one day, it is
still a labor-intensive process that consumes time and money. Thus, the
argument is that if the case is going to proceed to full trial anyway, time
and money could be saved by not participating in the SJT. However, as a
way of assisting litigants in recouping expenses associated with
participating in SJTs, courts usually schedule the full trial within thirty days
after the SJT. 113 This reduces costs to parties participating in the SJT by
eliminating the duplication of "full preparation for both summary jury trial
and a trial on the merits." 114 Furthermore, even if the SJT does not succeed
in promoting settlement of the case, "the value of the summary jury trial in
crystalizing the issues and the proof is immeasurable to the later binding
trial, to which all parties come more fully prepared and rehearsed in their
107 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods
of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REv.
366 (1986).
108 See Harges, supra note 76, at 807.
109 See id.
110 Id.
111 See id. at 807.
112 See id.
113 See id. at 804, 807.
114 Id. at 804.
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roles and the trial procedure." 115 Overall, even if it does not result in
settlement, the SJT can be beneficial for trial preparation.
IV. THE USE OF MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY
TRIALS IN DESIGN DEFECT CASES
A. Characteristics of Design Defect Cases Making Them Well Suited
for Mandatory Summary Jury Trials
There are several reasons design defect cases are suitable for
mandatory SJTs. As an initial matter, the parties in a design defect case are
unlikely to suggest SJT or any other settlement technique because of the
fear that this will portray a case weakness. 116 Thus, settlement methods that
are court-ordered rather than party-initiated are most useful in design defect
cases.117 There are several characteristics of design defect cases that make
them well suited for mandatory SJTs. First, the Restatement (Third)
provides that liability is based on negligence and proof of a reasonable
alternative design, making design defect cases well suited for SJTs because
the jury decides the key issues involved. Second, discovery is substantially
completed before settlement is feasible in design defect cases, making their
posture ideal for the SJT. Third, significant trial costs are attributed to
expert witnesses and trials can last a month or longer in design defect
cases, making them well suited for the one day SJT procedure where
substantial savings in trial time and expert fees can be realized.
First, the Restatement (Third) of Torts provides that liability is based on
negligence and proof of a reasonable alternative design, 118 making design
defect cases well suited for SJTs because the jury decides the key issues
involved. Under the Restatement (Third), the jury must determine whether
a reasonable person could conclude that the manufacturer could have
115 Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988); see
also Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. 603, 607 (D. Minn. 1988).
116 See HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 13.05 (explaining that parties rarely
initiate settlement proceedings in products liability cases).
117 See id. Note, if one or both of the parties suggest the use of SJT in a defective
product case, this is another way to implement the process, but this is unlikely in any
products liability case. See id.
118 See supra notes 28, 36-38 and accompanying text.
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chosen a safer alternative design. 119 Thus, the issues of negligence and the
existence of a reasonable alternative design are for the jury to decide. 120
Moreover, Judge Thomas Lambros indicated that design defect cases
are appropriate for SJTs when he explained:
There is a certain class of cases in which the only bar to settlement
among parties is the difference in opinion of how a jury will perceive
evidence adduced at trial. These cases involve issues, like that of "the
reasonable man" in negligence litigation, where no amount of
jurisprudential refinement and clarification of the applicable law can aid in
resolution of the case. In these cases, settlement negotiations must often
involve an analysis of similar jury trials within the experience of counsel
and the trial judge as to the findings of liability and damage 21
Thus, design defect cases are well suited for the SJT because the key
issues, negligence and existence of a safer alternative design, are issues
decided by the jury. Moreover, the SJT allows the parties to obtain an
actual jury's perception of their case. 122 This jury perception can be very
persuasive and thus promote settlement in cases where parties "have a
good-faith difference in their evaluations of the case." 123
Second, because discovery basically is completed before settlement is
feasible in design defect cases, their posture is ideal for the SJT. "For SJT
to be truly beneficial, the case must substantially be in a posture for trial.
Discovery must be complete and there must be no motions pending." 124
119 "More specifically, the test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at
reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and,
if so, whether the omission of the alternative design... rendered the product not
reasonably safe." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d (1998).
120 See id. § 2 cmt. f ("The necessity of proving a reasonable alternative design as
a predicate for establishing design defect is ... addressed initially to the
courts .... Assuming that a court concludes that sufficient evidence on this issue has
been presented, the issue is then for the trier of fact.").
121 LAMBROS, supra note 12, app. A at 1; see also Woodley, supra note 104, at
610 (stating that SJTs are appropriate in cases where parties disagree as to how a jury
will decide the key issues of a case).
122 See LAMBROS, supra note 12, at 10.
123 Alexander B. Denson, The Summary Jury Trial: A Proposal from the Bench,
1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 303, 306 (1995) (stating that such cases are appropriate for
SJTs).
124 LAMBROS, supra note 12, at 12; see also Woodley, supra note 104, at 610
("Discovery must be complete and the case must be ready for trial prior to the
commencement of the summary jury trial."). Judge Lambros's justification for this is
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Under the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests, discovery basically
must be completed in order to obtain evidence sufficient to establish
liability.125 For this reason, settlement prior to completion of discovery is
unlikely because the plaintiff has little bargaining power and risks
conveying the perception of a weak case. 126 Therefore, because discovery
is completed before settlement becomes feasible, design defect cases are in
a trial-ready posture, making them well suited for the SJT procedure.' 27
Third, significant trial costs are attributed to expert witnesses 128 and
trials can last a month or longer in design defect cases, 129 making them
well suited for the one-day SJT procedure where substantial savings in
expert fees and trial time can be realized.1 30 Moreover, savings are realized
by the parties and by the court. For the parties, expert witness fees are
reduced 131 because the number of experts and length of their testimony is
based on the reasoning that evidence rulings can be determined more accurately for
cases where discovery is substantially complete. Thus, only admissible evidence will be
presented at the SJT. See LmmRos, supra note 12, at 12.
125 See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.
126 See HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 13.05. However, if the defendant
wishes to settle, settlement prior to completion of discovery is much more likely.
127 Cf LAMBROS, supra note 12, at 12.
128 See supra Part II.C.
129 See id.
130 See Woodley, supra note 104, at 610 (stating that SJTs are appropriate in cases
where "the trial will consume significant resources (e.g., high expert costs, take longer
than a week to try, etc.)"); see also PLAPINGER ET AL., supra note 7, reprinted in part
in Elizabeth Plapinger et al., Center for Pub. Resources, Judge's Deskbook on Court
ADR, 12 ALTERNATrvs TO HIGH CosT LmG. 9, 14 (1994) (stating that "cases headed
for a jury trial of over five days" are appropriate for SJTs).
131 One study of mandatory SJTs found that billable attorney hours remained the
same or increased for attorneys using SJTs because of the extensive post-SJT settlement
negotiations that took place. See James Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and
Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4
OMO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 213, 231-32 (1989). However, even if attorney fees
remain the same or increase slightly due to post-SJT settlement negotiations, the parties
would still realize significant savings in expert witness fees. See Telephone Interview
with Robert M. Libbey, Attorney, Law Offices of Robert M. Libbey (Feb. 15, 1999)
(explaining that on the average, expert trial testimony in design defect cases costs
between $25,000 and $50,000 per case for plaintiffs). Assuming the defendant uses
expert testimony to rebut the plaintiff's experts, the trial testimony for defendants per
case should be roughly the same.
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significantly reduced. 132 For the court, savings are realized where the SJT
promotes settlement because the one-day process provides the court with
flexibility to devote attention to and dispose of more cases in a given
year. 133 Thus, design defect cases are well suited for SJTs because the
parties and the court realize substantial savings.
B. Recommendations for Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Procedures
in Design Defect Cases
Although federal courts have the authority to compel parties to
participate in SJTs, they also have the discretion to tailor the procedures to
each case. 134 Flexibility in the SJT procedure is a key factor to its
successful use. 135 Therefore, certain recommendations should be considered
when using mandatory SJTs in design defect cases. First, courts should
provide for the use of expert witnesses in SJT proceedings. Second, courts
should conduct a pre-SJT conference to rule on all evidentiary issues prior
to the SJT. Third, courts should establish that SJT proceedings are closed
to the public and cannot be used in a trial on the merits.
First, courts should provide for the use of expert witnesses in SJT
proceedings because design defect cases rely heavily on expert
testimony. 136 Specifically, SJT proceedings should allow testimony from
plaintiff's design expert and defendant's design expert. 137 However, the
number of experts used and the extent of their testimony should be
limited 138 because the length of the SJT normally does not exceed one
132 Significant trial costs are attributed to expert fees in design defect cases
because of the number of experts used and the length of their testimony. See supra Part
II.C. The SJT provides for the testimony of experts in design defect cases, but limits
the number of experts who can testify and the length of their testimony based on the
one-day procedure. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (regarding Judge Spiegel's
discussion).
134 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) (providing federal courts with broad discretion
when considering special procedures for settlement).
135 See Harges, supra note 76, at 806.
136 See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
137 See Woodley, supra note 104, at 612 (providing a model SJT procedure that
allows the use of witnesses in cases that tum on witness credibility).
138 See id. Woodley's model SJT procedure provides for "a short, narrative
statement by one or more live witnesses." Id.
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day. 139 Furthermore, consistent with the length of the SJT, a short direct
examination and cross-examination should be allowed to provide the jury
with a basis for judging witness credibility. 140
Second, courts should conduct a pre-SJT conference to rule on all
evidentiary issues prior to the SJT.141 This ensures that only admissible
evidence will be presented at the SJT, thus making the SJT verdict more
predictive of an actual verdict rendered from a full trial on the merits. 142 In
addition, the pre-SJT conference reduces the need for objections that would
tend to prolong a one-day SJT proceeding. 143
Third, in the interest of promoting settlement through SJTs, courts
should establish that SJTs are closed to the public where either party has an
interest in keeping the proceeding private. Furthermore, courts should
establish that any part of the SJT proceeding cannot be used in a trial on the
merits. The Supreme Court has held that the analysis for a First
Amendment claim of access to judicial proceedings involves a two-part
test. 144 First, the judicial proceeding must be one that historically has been
open to the public and the press. 145 Second, general public access must play
a "significant positive role in the functioning of the [judicial] process in
question." 146 Under this analysis, the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Co. v. General Electric Co. held that there is no First Amendment
right to SJT proceedings. 147 The court in Cincinnati Gas found that the SJT
is a settlement technique, 148 and settlement techniques historically have
been closed to the public. 149 Furthermore, where a party has a legitimate
139 See id. at 611. The model procedure states that the court can extend the SJT to
two days in some cases. See id.
140 See id. at 612. The model procedure provides for "a limited direct examination
(e.g., 10 minutes) and cross-examination (e.g., 15 minutes) .... ." Id.
141 See LAMBROS, supra note 12, at 12; Denson, supra note 123, at 307; Woodley,
supra note 104, at 612.
142 See LAMBROs, supra note 12, at 12.
143 Woodley provides in her model SJT procedure that: "Objections by counsel
during the summary jury trial are discouraged, but will be allowed if opposing counsel
clearly violates rules" of evidence. Woodley, supra note 104, at 612.
144 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1986).
145 See id.
146 Id. (citation omitted).
147 See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904-05
(6th Cir. 1988).
148 See id. at 903-04.
149 See id. (citing Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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interest in keeping the SJT confidential, the court found that allowing
public access would be detrimental to the promotion of settlement and thus
would not play a "'significant positive role in the functioning of the
process . ,,"'150 Thus, in the interest of promoting settlement, courts
should establish, as did Cincinnati Gas, that SJTs are closed to the public
where either party objects to public access.
Finally, courts should firmly establish that "neither the jury findings
nor any statement of counsel during the summary jury trial are admissible
on the trial on the merits or may be construed as judicial admissions. " 151
The court in Russell v. PPG Industries, Inc. explained the reasoning behind
this principle in stating: "Were we to allow parties to offer information
from the summary jury trial to this [trial on the merits, the SJT's] utility as
a settlement device would be significantly undermined and parties'
willingness to participate in the process [would be] substantially
decreased. ' 152 Therefore, in establishing that SJT proceedings cannot be
used in a full trial on the merits, courts promote settlement by encouraging
full, risk-free participation by the parties.153
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, because of the characteristics of design defect cases,
federal courts should use mandatory SJTs to promote settlement of design
defect cases bound for trial. This Note focused on federal use of SJTs
because federal courts have the authority to implement SJTs. However,
where state courts have the authority to implement SJTs, they also should
use such proceedings to promote settlement in design defect cases.
The SJT is an efficient and effective proceeding that enables judges to
better manage the number of cases filed in court. 154 Chief Justice Warren
Burger referred to judges using SJTs as "'judicial pioneers [who] should be
commended for their innovative programs. We need more of them in the
150 Id. (quoting Press Enter., 478 U.S. at 8).
151 Spiegel, supra note 97, at 831.
152 Russell v. PPG Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 326, 334 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing FED. R.
EVID. 408).
153 See id. ("The purpose of the summary jury trial is 'to motivate litigants toward
settlement. ... ' The device is 'designed to provide a "no risk" method by which the
parties may obtain the perception of six jurors .... '") (citations omitted).
154 See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An Effective Aid to
Settlement, 77 JUDICATuRE 6, 6-7 (1993).
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future." ' 155 Judge Thomas Lambros summed up nicely by explaining: "We
have begun a new era in our adversarial process with the evolution of new
models of advocacy. The summary jury trial is an integral part of this
evolution, earning its status as a vital part of the American adversarial
system. "156
155 Id. at 8, 12 (quoting FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR
PROMOTING SETTLEMENTS: SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES 43 (1986) (quoting WARREN BURGER, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY
(1984))).
156 Id. at 12.

